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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the role of export costs in the process of poverty reduction in rural Africa. We
claim that the marketing costs that emerge when the commercialization of export crops requires intermediaries
can lead to lower participation into export cropping and, thus, to higher poverty. We test the model
using data from the Uganda National Household Survey. We show that: i) farmers living in villages
with fewer outlets for sales of agricultural exports are likely to be poorer than farmers residing in market-endowed
villages; ii) market availability leads to increased household participation in export cropping (coffee,
tea, cotton, fruits); iii) households engaged in export cropping are less likely to be poor than subsistence-based
households. We conclude that the availability of markets for agricultural export crops help realize
the gains from trade. This result uncovers the role of complementary factors that provide market access
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Trade costs, which include international transportation costs, transaction costs, and
distribution costs in countries of origin, destination, and transit, are an important barrier
to trade. Estimates from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels (2001) indicate
that these costs can in fact be much larger than taris and other trade policy barriers. Even
in places where formal trade barriers are almost fully eliminated, trade costs still remain as
strong barriers to exports and imports.
Trade costs prevent the full realization of the gains from trade. In developing countries,
these costs can also wither the poverty alleviation role of export opportunities.1 In addition,
some of the costs associated with exports, and thus the impacts of trade on incomes
and poverty, depend to a large extent on complementary domestic factors like improved
infrastructure, adequate competition policies and, especially in Africa, enhanced access to
credit, better education and health, and low marketing or intermediation costs.
In this paper, we explore the costs of trade for domestic producers when exporting
requires intermediaries, a widespread phenomenon in many developing countries. The need
for intermediaries in export activities can generate wide marketing costs in agriculture.2 The
focus of our investigation is intermediation costs in export crops in Uganda. Specically, we
claim here that, in rural Uganda, the lack of local outlets for export crops like coee, tea,
and cotton raises their marketing costs, prevents the adoption of high-return crops in favor
of subsistence crops like maize or matooke, and impedes farmers to take full advantage of
high export prices and enhanced market access opportunities abroad.3
We begin by developing a model of agricultural production with marketing costs. The
1See the reviews in Winters, McCulloch and Mckay (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnic (2007).
2These marketing costs are non-traditional trade costs like those in Lim~ ao and Venables (2001), who
analyze trade costs beyond transportation costs. They show that the total cost of transportation depends
on the level of infrastructure of trading partners.
3There is an increasing interest in the complementarities between trade and domestic factors. Three
recent edited volumes on trade and poverty, Harrison (2007), Hertel and Winters (2006), and Hoekman and
Olarreaga (2007), testify to this. A few more specic examples include Porto (2005), who shows that informal
barriers to trade have signicant eects on poverty in Moldova; Welch, McMillan, and Rodrik (2003), who
argue that the negative impacts of the liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique was mainly due
to the structure of the internal markets; Nicita (2008), who studies policies that facilitate the transmission
of international prices to the household in Mexico; and Ashraf, Gin e and Karlan (2008), who assess the
eectiveness of DrumNet in the presence of quality requirement for exports in Kenya.
1model shows how farmers may be prevented from engaging in exporting activities, and
thus from earning higher income, when local marketing costs are too high. We then
test this hypothesis using farming data from Uganda (the Uganda National Household
Survey). We combine household-level information on income, poverty and exporting
activities with village-level measures of availability of local agricultural export markets.
These markets include a variety of outlets: standard district markets and road stalls; export
intermediaries (truck services and farm-gate buyers); and foreign direct investment in the
form of commercial tea and coee plantations.
Our empirical analysis establishes a negative relationship between local availability
of export markets and poverty: controlling for all the relevant household and district
determinants and taking account of endogeneity issues, we nd that the presence of export
markets leads to lower poverty in rural Uganda. We explore the exports mechanism behind
this link: we nd that export markets act as a facilitator of export agriculture cropping
(households may be prevented from entering export cash cropping if trading costs are too
high) and that poverty among producers of export crops is lower than poverty among
subsistence farmers (major export crops have higher returns than food crops). Overall, we
establish that lower export marketing costs induce export crop participation, which raises
household income and decreases the likelihood of poverty.
It is not surprising that domestic factors aect poverty and agricultural earnings. One
of the merits of our investigation is the nding of complementarities between those domestic
factors and the export opportunities: without domestic factors, the gains from trade may
not be realizable but, without exports, some domestic factors may become less relevant
for poverty alleviation. In addition, we identify one specic, and potentially important,
factor among these complementarities, namely the marketing costs of export crops.4 In
fact, the reduction in poverty resulting from increased export market availability can be
sizeable. Back of the envelope calculations show that equivalent poverty-reducing impacts
could only be generated by large increases in the international and farm-gate prices of export
4While we focus on trade costs, our approach is related to the work of Goyal (2008) and Jensen (2007), who
explore the role of improved marketing information (via cell phones or internet kiosks) on export adoption
by farmers. See Collier and Gunning (1999) for a thorough description of various major constraints to
development in Africa.
2crops arising, for example, from enhanced market access to developed countries. Hence,
the Uganda case is an instance where the standard prescriptions of education and health
policies could be combined with more specic measures to encourage the development of
local export markets (for example via the \aid for trade" paradigm) in a successful attempt
towards poverty reduction.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of export choice and
marketing costs. In section 3, we describe the Uganda household survey and we introduce
our marketing costs hypothesis. In section 4, we explain the empirical strategy and discuss
results. In Section 5, we provide robustness checks and sensitivity analysis. Section 6
concludes.
2 A Model of Marketing Costs and Exports
We begin by laying out a simple model of export crop participation with marketing costs.
Farmers, who are endowed with one unit of land, must decide whether to specialize in the
production of food crops or export crops. Specialization in export crops delivers a physical
output of A per unit of land. Farmers are heterogeneous in land quality, ability in crop
husbandry, xed assets and labor endowment. To capture this exogenous heterogeneity
across farmers, we let output A follow a density function f with support [0;1): In contrast,
specialization in food crops has a homogeneous return of R per unit of land. The relative
price of export crops to food crops is denoted by p.
Food crops and export crops dier in their marketability. Food crops are used for own
consumption or can be marketed at no cost. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there
is a fringe of food producers that supply food crops at a constant marginal cost. These food
producers are arbitrage food traders, landless individuals working on public land or farmers
who cannot meet the xed costs of export participation (in scale, know-how, etc.). This
assumption allows us to pin down the price of food, which we thereby set to one.5
5The assumptions of complete specialization in production and of the existence of a fringe of food
production at constant marginal cost simplify the model. In a dierent technological environment, with
decreasing returns for instance, some farmers will end up in an interior solution with positive production of
both food and export crops. This just complicates the computation of the expected export output without
3Marketing export crops is costly. We assume that export activities are carried out by
intermediaries that purchase the export crop locally and sell it internationally. Farmers
who choose to produce export crops need to transport and market their output to the local
intermediaries, who are in turn in charge of shipping output to international markets.
The economy is composed of many districts. For simplicity, we assume that farmers
need to sell their export crop output to an intermediary in their own district. A district
is represented by a unit circle. Farmers are uniformly distributed along the circle with a
measure of L farmers at each point in the circle. There is a nite number of intermediaries,
n, who are located symmetrically along the same circle, at a distance of 1=n from each other.
The distance between farmers and intermediaries determines the marketing (transport) costs.
A farmer that is located at a distance x from a given intermediary incurs a marketing cost
of x per unit of output.
Intermediaries have market power and compete in prices. Farmers are small and take
prices from the dierent intermediaries as given. Once farmers get a draw A from f, they
make two decisions: (1) whether to produce food or export crops; (2) to which intermediary
to sell the output of the export crop. The decision sequence is solved backwards. First, each
farmer nds the intermediary i that oers him the best \price-distance" combination, i.e.,
the maximum net price (pi  xi). Let (p;x) denote the best price-distance combination for
a given farmer. Given (p;x) and the output level A, the farmer chooses to produce export
crops or food crops. Farmers with (p   x)A  R specialize in export crops, while farmers
with (p   x)A < R specialize in food crops. We can thus dene an export specialization
cuto e A, the level of output that leaves a farmer indierent between cropping activities,
given by (p   x) e A(p;x) = R.
Expected supply of export crops at a price-distance combination (p;x) is obtained by
adding further insights. On the other hand, in the absence of the fringe food production, the expansion
of export cropping may cause food supply to decline and food price to increase. This will prevent some
farmers at the margin from specializing in exports. While these dynamics seem interesting to explore, our
qualitative conclusion from the model|that lower trading costs lead to more export participation and lower
poverty|are not aected by them.







e A(p;x) Af(A)dA; p   x > 0
0 p   x  0:
Intermediaries buy export crops from farmers at the price p, and sell the crops in international
markets at the exogenous international price, P . The cost of transporting crops from a
district to the international market is given by
(2) C = D + dQ;
where D is a xed cost of intermediation, Q is the total quantity of export crops that an
intermediary buys from all farmers, and d is the unitary transport cost to ship output from
the center of the district (given by the center of the circle) to international markets. Surplus
is given by (P    d   p)Q   D. There is free entry until prots from the intermediation
activity are zero. The location choice is exogenous.
A given intermediary i chooses a price pi taking competition as given. Since intermediaries
are symmetric, they charge the same price in equilibrium. We can thus summarize the
competition faced by intermediary i by the price charged by his competitors, p0, and by the




   d   pi)Q(pi;p0;n)   D:
To solve the maximization problem, we need to construct the total supply faced by
intermediary i, Q(pi;p0;n). Because of the symmetry in prices, we only need to consider
the two contiguous competitors, which are located at a distance of 1=n to the left and to
the right of i. Let x denote the distance between intermediary i and a farmer located to his
right. This farmer is located at a distance 1=n   x from the right competitor. Given the
prices charged by i and by the right competitor, pi and p0, we can dene a cuto distance
e x so that the farmer located at e x is indierent between the two intermediaries. The cuto
5distance is dened by pi   e x(pi;p0;n) = p0   
 
1
n   e x(pi;p0;n)

; with







Farmers at a distance x  e x(pi;p0;n) sell to intermediary i and farmers at a distance
x > e x(pi;p0;n) sell to the right competitor.
Total supply faced by an intermediary i from farmers located to the right and to the
left is obtained by integrating the expected supply dened in (1) over farmers at distances
between zero and e x. This yields




The situation is depicted in Figure 1. The base and height of the rectangle represent the
two dimensions of heterogeneity among farmers: location and potential output from export
crops. Distance to intermediary i is measured in the horizontal axis, with the largest possible
distance being 1=n, and output on the vertical axis. Prices are given. Farmers to the right
of e x choose the competitor's price-distance combination (although some of them might end
up choosing to specialize in food crops). Farmers to the left of e x choose the price-distance
combination oered by intermediary i. Among the latter, those farmers with lower potential
output from export crops (A < e A) specialize in food crops, and those with higher potential
output (A  e A) specialize in export crops and constitute the supply faced by intermediary i.
The cuto output level e A depends on distance. Farmers that are closer to the intermediary
need to cover lower transportation costs, therefore, they require a lower level of output to
nd export crops more protable than food crops.
Intermediaries choose prices to maximize prots dened in (3) taking the prices of the
competitors as given and subject to the supply function dened in (5). In equilibrium all
intermediaries charge the same price. For a given number of intermediaries n, the prot
maximizing rst order condition evaluated at equilibrium prices p is (dropping subindex i)
(6)  Q(p;p0;n)jp0=p + (P




6The number of intermediaries n is determined endogenously by the free-entry, zero-prot
condition. This is
(7) (P
   d   p)Q(p;p0;n)jp0=p   D = 0:
Equations (6) and (7), subject to the supply function in (5), dene the equilibrium prices p
and number of competitors n.
To characterize the equilibrium, we need to impose some structure on the density function
of export crop yields. In Figure 2, we explore the case of an exponential distribution of A.
The combinations of prices and number of intermediaries that satisfy the prot maximization
condition (6) are positively sloped. More intermediaries n means more competition so that
the prot maximizing price oered to farmers is higher. The combination of prices and
intermediaries that satisfy the zero prot condition (7) is negatively sloped. Lower prices
oered to farmers mean higher prots so that more intermediaries can aord to pay the xed
costs and enter the market. The equilibrium prices and number of competitors are given by
the intersection point E.6
The model delivers several predictions that we test in sections 4 and 5. Our main
hypothesis is that households residing in districts with a larger number of intermediaries,
and thus with lower marketing costs for export crops, are less likely to be poor; that the
choice to produce export crops is in part explained by the presence of intermediaries; and
that the choice to produce export crops in part explains the lower likelihood of poverty. In
the model, we can establish these results by comparing two districts with dierent number
of intermediaries.7 Given the equilibrium symmetric price oered by all intermediaries and





; hence, the probability that a random farmer, anywhere in the circle,
6Similar equilibria can be found for other functions f such as the Pareto distribution (which is often used
in productivity analysis). Notice that an equilibrium with entry may not exist (for example in the case of a
low international price P and large costs of access to international markets D and d). See below.
7Notice that these are cross-sectional correlations (across districts) and not comparative static results
because n is an endogenous variable (see below for a discussion of some exogenous variables that determine p
and n in equilibrium). In fact, this analysis highlights the endogeneity issues that we tackle in our empirical
work.
7produces export crops can be derived after integration over x










In Appendix A, we show that, conditional on the price p, this probability is increasing in the
number of intermediaries n. This is because the presence of more intermediaries reduces the
average distance from farmers to intermediaries and thus decreases average marketing costs.
In consequence, a larger number of farmers will nd it protable to specialize in export crops.
Further, this implies that the expected income of the farmer increases in n and thus that







where q(x;p)=L is the expected output of export crops by a typical farmers (equation (1)).
Integrating over x, the expected income of a random farmer is














We prove in Appendix A that Y () is indeed increasing in n. For our purposes, these results
establish a relationship between lower marketing costs in export cropping and lower poverty
in rural areas.
In our empirical work, we will exploit regional variation in the number of intermediaries
to explore the relationship between export marketing costs, export adoption, and poverty.
The model can be used to think about exogenous determinants of the equilibrium number of
intermediaries. Both p and n depend on parameters that are common to all districts, like the
international price (P ), and parameters that can vary across districts, like the out-of-district
cost of access to international markets (D and d), district size (L), and the distribution of
returns to export cropping. Therefore, dierences in these parameters across districts will
generate dierences in prices and in the number of intermediaries. For practical purposes,
this implies that we can use some of these exogenous parameters, such as the out-of-district
cost of transportation to international markets,8 as valid instruments in the instrumental
variables specications of the model (sections 4 and 5).
8This is an out-of-district cost and must not be confused with marketing costs within a district.
8We close the discussion of our model with two remarks. First, crop marketing between
intermediaries and farmers in developing countries is often subject to incomplete contracts
(Ashraf, Gin e and Karlan, 2008; Brambilla and Porto, 2007; Kranton and Swamy, 2008).
With limited contract enforceability, intermediaries, especially if there are only a few, can
hold up farmers paying low prices for their crops. This can lead to a situation where few
intermediaries enter and few farmers adopt. In our model there are two main reasons why
a high market density can facilitate the adoption of export crops and lower poverty: lower
marketing costs within a district and higher oered prices. Thus, while we do not model
hold-up issues explicitly, in the sense that we do not model the role of incomplete contracts
as in Kranton and Swamy (2008), we do describe a setting in which prot maximization
by intermediaries with market power leads to price levels that prevent some farmers from
adopting export crops, which in turn also leads to low market density. In our model, market
density is determined by out-of-district transportation costs, district size and productivity
parameters. But hold up and incomplete contracting are other possible determinants and
our story is entirely consistent with them.
Second, the interrelation between marketing costs and export opportunities in poverty
reduction is a feature of the model that deserves emphasis. The claims in this paper are that
exports matter for poverty alleviation provided marketing costs are low enough, and that low
marketing costs are not necessarily conducive to poverty alleviation in the absence of export
opportunities. It is the combination of export opportunities (for example, through a high
international price) and domestic conditions (through low marketing costs) that works. To
see this, notice that, for given intermediation costs, a suciently low international price can
cause the Prot Maximization and the Zero Prot loci not to cross in the positive orthant.
Similarly, even if the international price is high, prohibitive marketing costs can lead to an
autarky equilibrium with farmers specialized in low-return food crops. In this situation, high
marketing costs prevent farmers from realizing the gains from exports.
93 The Uganda National Household Survey
To test the relationship between marketing costs, export cropping, and poverty, we work
with the 1999/2000 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). The data are a large-scale
household survey conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics that covers the entire
country, rural and urban areas. The sampling design is a stratied two-stage sampling.
The rst stage units are the Enumerator Areas of the 1991 Population Census and the
second stage units are the households.
There are two sets of data in the UNHS: household data and community data. From the
household data we construct measures of expenditures, poverty and export participation at
the household level. With the community data, we construct a measure of marketing costs
at the district level.
The household-level data include socio-economic and enterprise modules. There
are modules related to household characteristics (household composition, demographics),
activity status, health, education, and housing amenities. There are also questions on
consumption expenditure and sources of income (farm and non-farm activities, employment,
remittances), and a crop module with questions on land allocation, production, sales,
home-consumption, etc. Sample statistics are reported in Table 1.
Our empirical analysis focuses on poverty and household expenditures. To determine the
poverty status of each household, we use the expenditure module and compare household
expenditures with poverty lines. We use the head count as a measure of poverty: a household
with a per equivalent adult expenditure below the poverty line is considered poor.9 Average
per equivalent adult expenditure in rural Uganda was 42.64 PPP dollars per month (29,550
Uganda Shillings). Rural poverty lines for each province were constructed by Appleton
(1999). The average poverty line for rural areas was 31.44 PPP dollars per month (21,790
Ugandan Shillings), or 1.05 dollars per day. The poverty rate in 1999 was 35 percent.
Households do not export directly but we can infer their export-related activities from
the crops they grow. We divide crops into two groups, export crops and food crops. The
9Per equivalent adult expenditure is a measure of per capita expenditure that accounts for economies
of scale and for dierences in the consumption needs across demographic categories (children, adults, etc.)
within the household.
10division is based on aggregate data on Ugandan exports, reported in Table 2. Major export
commodities are coee, cotton, tea, and tobacco, and other non-traditional products such as
sh, fruits, and owers. In the crop questionnaire of the Uganda National Household Survey,
prevailing export crops are coee, tea, cotton, pineapples, and passion fruits.10 Food crops
include matooke (banana), maize, sweet potatoes, sorghum. Food crops are mostly destined
to home consumption.
In our analysis, we aggregate all the export crops into one export crop activity. While
there may be dierences across crops that are worth exploring, our data are not rich enough
to conduct a detailed disaggregated analysis (see below). In the empirical work, we exploit
regional disparities in export adoption, poverty, and marketing costs as identifying variation.
Figure 3 gives an overview of regional disparities in export crops in Uganda based on
information from the UNHS and FAO. The gure includes four panels, each one of them
depicting the prevalence of dierent crops in dierent regions. The top-left map reveals that
coee is mostly produced in the center of the country and in mountainous regions in the
Southwest, West, Northwest, and East. Tea (top-right map) is produced in the South, the
Center, and in some Northern regions. Cotton (bottom-left panel) is the major crop of the
Northern provinces; there is some cotton production in the Southwest and Southeast as well.
Finally, fruits, like passion fruits and pineapples, are grown in the Center, the Northwest
and the Southwest.
To quantify export participation at the household level, we use two denitions, the share
of land allocated to export crops and the share of income derived from export crops. The
average plot size in the data was 2.57 acres (Table 1). Around 7 percent of household land
is allocated to export crops; around 8 percent of household income is derived from the sale
of these crops. Participation in export agriculture is in fact limited in Uganda. It is our aim
to explore to what extent this is due to high export marketing costs.
Our measure of marketing costs in export agriculture comes from the community module.
The community module collects information on community characteristics at the level of
enumerator areas (the rst stage sampling units). In our regression analysis, we use this
10Other export products, like vanilla, sh or owers, are not signicant in the 1999/2000 data.
11information aggregated at the district level. We focus our analysis on rural areas, where
agriculture accounts for a large share of household income and the production of export
crops is more meaningful.11
As suggested by the model of section 2, marketing costs are closely related to the extent
of intermediation activity given by the presence of outlets where farmers can sell their export
crops. There are three dierent types of such markets in rural Uganda.12 First, the most
widespread way of marketing export crops is through export intermediaries. These are agents
that purchase output from farmers, store the production and then transport the agricultural
produce with pick-ups or small trucks to Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Second, typical
outlets for cash crop are district markets or stalls along the road to Kampala. Third, an
additional channel to sell agricultural produce is through large commercial plantations,
particularly of coee and tea. These plantations often purchase the output of neighbor
farmers thereby constituting additional channels of market availability. Most plantations
are run by foreign rms.
The community module provides information on whether there is at least one of the
three types of outlets available in each community.13 Since communities are very small and
farmers can in principle easily commercialize their products in neighboring communities, we
construct a measure of market density at the district level. There are several communities
(enumerator areas) in each district, and in each community the availability of markets is a
dichotomous variable. We dene export market density as the fraction of communities in a
given district in which there is at least one market for export crops available. Market density
captures the extent of intermediation activity in a district (including intermediaries in the
strict sense, road markets, and plantations). In districts where market density is higher, it
is easier for farmers to commercialize their export crops and marketing costs are lower.
11In urban areas, households earn a signicant share of income from wage labor, odd jobs and self
employment, whereas agricultural income is much less important.
12The survey asks separate questions on availability of food markets where farmers can sell the production
surplus of food crops. This means that the availability of agricultural export produce markets refers to
commodity markets and cash crops like coee, tea, and cotton.
13There is no information on the specic type of outlet or on the number of outlets. This forces us to
aggregate export market availability for all crops and prevents us from exploiting dierences in intermediation
costs at the crop level.
12At the national level, the average market density is 0.37 (Table 3). This means that, on
average, in 37 percent of the communities there is at least one outlet for agricultural produce,
namely intermediaries, export crop stalls, or local large plantations. Instead, the prevalence
of surplus food markets (sweet potatoes, bananas, tomatoes) is much higher: average food
market density reaches 0.76.
Table 3 reports other important measures of community infrastructure that we use in
our regression analysis. In the community module, there are questions on distance to paved
roads; dichotomous access to infrastructure variables such as access to credit, improved
seeds, oxen use and rental, tractors, extension services; major village constraints in terms of
input markets, roads, disease, security, land, credit, land fertility; and indicators of access to
veterinary services, existence of land conict, availability of communal land, primary school,
free medicine, water services, public hospital, and private hospitals. We use all these control
variables in the regression estimation.
4 Estimation and Results
Our testing hypothesis is that a farmer faced with the decision to adopt a higher-return
export crop is more likely to participate, therefore being less likely to be poor, when access
to export markets is less costly. This is because better access to export markets facilitates
trade and lowers marketing costs. In our analysis, we use market density as a measure of
access to export markets at the district level.
Figure 4 takes a rst look at the data to establish descriptive correlations between the
three variables of interest, market density, exports and poverty, using non-parametric models.
For each pair of variables, we estimate Fan locally kernel weighted regressions with a Gaussian
kernel.14 The rst panel plots the estimates of a non-parametric regression between poverty
and market density. We see that the relationship is negative, with lower poverty associated
with higher market density. Notice that the relationship is quite strong when there are few
14The Fan regression comprises a set of weighted local OLS regressions at dierent levels of the right-hand
side variable x. For a given level of x, observations further away are given less weight according to the
Gaussian function and the bandwidth (equal to 0.15 in the rst and second panels and 0.05 in the third
panel). See Pagan and Ullah (1999) for further details.
13markets available but debilitates at high market density.
The second panel displays the non-parametric correlation between export market density
and export crop participation. The solid line corresponds to the share of land allocated
to export crops and the broken line, to the share of export crops in income. As our
hypothesis suggests, the graph reveals that the availability of markets for agriculture produce
is positively linked to export cropping. Finally, the third panel displays the relationship
between poverty and export crop participation. As argued, the graph reveals that a higher
participation in export agriculture is associated with a lower likelihood of poverty.
The graphical representation of the relationship between market density, export cropping,
and poverty is a descriptive tool. In what follows, we approach the issue from a formal
regression analysis of each of the three correlations illustrated in Figure 4. The econometric
model takes other controls and reverse causality issues into account.
4.1 An Econometric Model of Market Density and Poverty
We begin by investigating the relationship between poverty and export marketing costs,
which are inversely related to export market density. We set up the following regression
model







where Phc is a dichotomous variable that indicates the poverty status of household h in
district c, Mc is export market density in district c, prc is an export price index in district
c, and xhc and zc are household and district characteristics. Market density captures the
three marketing channels described in the previous section: i) intermediaries; ii) export crop
market stalls; iii) large scale plantations. Estimates of 1 will reveal how poverty is aected
by marketing costs in exports.
The model includes a large set of controls. The vector xhc includes household
characteristics: size, demographic composition, age and gender of the household head, the
level of education and literacy of the head, and his/her health status. We also include
14a full set of district variables, zc, that measure social and economic infrastructure. The
district controls are the variables described in Table 3. They include access to credit, roads,
equipment (oxen, tractors), inputs, and extension services, indicators of major agricultural
constraints (land quality, land availability, input availability, diseases), educational, medical,
sanitary and veterinary infrastructure, and prevalence of security and conicts. This
extensive set of district controls is important to purge the regression from district eects
that may confound the eects of export market density. For instance, the district controls
account for dierences in district economic (roads, equipment, credit) and social (health)
infrastructure that can simultaneously aect the level of poverty, export crop adoption
and market density. Similarly, these variables will control for social conict and security,
which might be conducive to higher poverty and lower export participation. This is
especially important in some parts of Northern Uganda.15 Further, they account for potential
bio-climatic dierences in the country by controlling for dierences in input availability (land,
variable inputs) and the average quality of land. In our model, all these district controls
(or, rather, their linear combination) work as a proxy for the district eect (the district
component of the error term in equation (10)). In the absence of panel data, including this
proxy improves the estimation of the market density term 1. However, being just proxies,
the estimates of the district controls lack any structural interpretation.
An important control in our regression is the export price index, which serves several
purposes. As described in the model of section 2, dierences in intermediation activity
across districts (i.e., dierences in market density) are associated with dierences in export
marketing costs and with dierences in the prices oered to the farmers. Market density is
an imperfect measure of marketing costs in exports and could include traces of price eects.
It is thus important to control for prices to isolate the true eects of marketing costs on
poverty.
To construct the price index, we proceed as follows. Households that produce export
crops report unit values for their sales, which approximate the producer prices net of
marketing costs (p   x in the model of Section 2). Given the price p oered by the
15Other Northern districts, where conict is more widespread, are excluded from the regressions.
15intermediaries, dierences in unit values across households within a district are explained
mostly by marketing costs, x.16 Since we want to separate the eect of prices from the eects
of export marketing costs, we need to control for the price oered by the intermediaries in
a district, p (and not for the reported p   x, which varies at the household level). To do
this, we approximate the price p with the price faced by the farmer with the lowest possible
marketing cost (x = 0 in the model), that is, the farmer with the highest observed unit value.
For robustness against outliers, we use the 75th percentile of the distribution of household
unit values in each district as a measure of p. Finally, since we are pooling together dierent
export crops (coee, cotton, tea, passion fruits and pineapples), the export price index is a
weighted average of the 75th percentile log unit values of each of these crops, with weights
given by the average share of land allocated to each crop in the district.
Notice that export prices and the weights attached to them play another important
function. As shown in Figure 3, farmers in dierent regions tend to specialize in dierent
export crops. Since these crops sell at dierent prices, specialization in dierent export crops
can lead to dierent poverty impacts. These regional dierences in protability across export
crops can be controlled for with the weights used in the construction of the export price,
that is, the shares of each export crop.
Even after controlling for all these confounding factors, the major econometric concern
with regression (10) is the reverse causality between poverty and market density. Poverty
is lower when marking costs are lower, and markets may develop in richer districts. We
need instruments that are exogenous determinants of market density and that vary by
district. The model of section 2 suggests that good candidates are the costs of intermediation
activity, such as the out-of-district transportation cost from each district to international
markets, represented in the model by d and D. Out-of-district transportation costs indicate
16The argument that dierences in unit values at the household level are mostly explained by marketing
costs is clearly an abstraction of the model. In practice, part of those dierences can be explained by
dierences in market power at the farm level. Following a suggestion of one of the referees, we tested the
notion that marketing costs do indeed account for those dierences by running regressions, pooling all crops,
of log unit values (as deviations from district means) on the indicator of export market availability at the
village level (controlling also for district xed eects). We found a positive and statistically signicant
association between these variables. It follows that, within a district, farmers closer to the market fetch
higher unit values, which is in line with our empirical strategy.
16how dicult it is for intermediaries to reach export destinations. It is a fundamental
determinant of the protability of intermediation activities in export crops, either in the form
of intermediaries in the strict sense, market stalls, or plantations, and thus a determinant of
market density, our endogenous variable.
In Uganda, a landlocked country, most international shipments must go through the
capital, Kampala. We proxy the out-of-district transportation costs with district level data
on transportation costs from the center of each district to Kampala. These costs are reported
in the community questionnaire of the Uganda National Household Survey as the monetary
cost of reaching Kampala by car/truck.17
This strategy requires a careful control of the regression so as to make sure that
out-of-district transportation costs do not have a direct eect on the left-hand side variable
(poverty). In our regression model, there are two sets of such controls. A major control is
the export price index. Under imperfect competition among intermediaries, out-of-district
transportation costs are borne both by intermediaries (directly) and by farmers (via lower
prices). In districts where out-of-district transportation costs are lower, the prots of
intermediation are higher, more intermediaries enter, and farmers enjoy higher prices and
are less likely to be poor. For the instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction, we need to
control for the fraction of the out-of-district transportation costs that are borne by farmers.
We achieve this by including the export price index, which summarizes farmer prices and
includes the pass-through of out-of-district transportation costs. After including the price
index, there is no direct eect of out-of-district transportation costs on poverty via cost
pass-through.
The other set of controls comprises all district characteristics that could be aected
by out-of-district transport costs and that could have an eect on poverty. Districts
with lower out-of-district transport costs to Kampala could be less poor due to improved
infrastructure, higher local development, and better institutional quality. This eect is also
already controlled for in regression (10) with the extensive set of districts characteristics
17In this section, we estimate the model using one instrumental variable for our endogenous regressor. In
section 5, we provide a sensitivity analysis by estimating the model with an additional instrument.
17included in z.18 After including producer prices and district characteristics in the model, all
the channels through which out-of-district transport costs could aect poverty are accounted
for.
As a robustness check, we also include an additional district control, the density of food
markets, dened analogously to export market density. These markets are less sophisticated
than agriculture produce markets (coee stalls, intermediaries and plantations) and are thus
more ordinary. This variable controls for the thickness of food markets (and thus accounts
for food risk). In fact, in Uganda, food markets are fairly common whenever there are paved
or tarred roads. Food market density is a good aggregate indicator of district infrastructure
and development and could capture additional unobserved district characteristics.
The main results are shown in Table 4. In the rst panel, we report estimates from linear
IV regressions. The rst column corresponds to a simple linear model that only includes
households characteristics xhc as controls. We nd that market density, Mc, is negatively
and signicantly associated with poverty (b 1 =  0:56). Since Mc varies at the district level,
the estimation of the variance is corrected for clustering eects.
In column (2) of Table 4, we add district characteristics and infrastructure variables, zc,
and the export crop price index, prc (Table A1 in Appendix B reports these estimates). The
negative association between export market density and poverty is robust to the inclusion of
these variables. Notice, however, that the addition of district variables has a sizeable impact
on the coecient of market density, which drops to  0:27.
In column (3), we include food market density as an additional district variable to control
for further unobserved district eects. We nd that poverty is negatively associated with
the presence of food markets, although the relationship is not as strong as expected. For our
purposes, however, the critical nding is that the negative association between food market
density and poverty still shows up strongly in the regressions; further, the magnitude of 1,
 0:28, does not change much with respect to Model 2 (which is additional evidence that
the variables z account for much of the district eects in the model). Our ndings support
the hypothesis that households residing in districts endowed with more agriculture export
18These include access variables (to credit, roads, equipment, inputs, and extension services), agricultural
constraints (land quality, land availability), social infrastructure (education, health), security and conicts.
18markets are, on average, less likely to be poor: increasing the density of export markets
by 5 percentage points (from an average market density of 0:37|see Table 3) would cause
poverty to decline by 1.4 percentage points.
The validity of these results depends to a larger extent on the quality of the instrument.
We can assess how good our instrument is by looking at the rst stage regression, whereby
we regress the endogenous variable, market density, on the out-of-district transportation
costs, household characteristics xhc, district level controls zc, the export price index, and
food markets (explanatory variables vary across columns as described above). We report the
main coecients at the bottom of the rst row panel in Table 4. Notice that our instrument
has good explanatory power in the rst stage regression: districts with lower transportation
costs to Kampala are endowed with more export markets. Further, the F-statistic is greater
than 10 in the three specications, thus passing the test of weak instruments proposed by
Stock and Staiger (1997). Finally, the abrupt changes in the model when adding the district
controls and its stability when moving from Model 2 to Model 3 suggest that the district
eects are accounted for, a requirement for consistency of the IV estimator. Notice, however,
that in these regressions exogeneity of the instruments has to be maintained and cannot be
tested. In section 5, we expand the set of instruments as part of our robustness checks and
we perform overidentication tests of the model.
In the second panel of Table 4, we report OLS results, which, as expected, are negative
(and statistically signicant): in Models 2 and 3, for instance, the OLS estimates are  0:12
and  0:11, respectively. In our context, IV and OLS can dier because of two main reasons:
endogeneity bias (as argued above) and attenuation bias due to measurement error. Market
density is measured with error because, as revealed by our own eld work in Uganda, there
were dierences in the interpretation of the community questions on the availability of export
outlets. In some cases, the confusion arose because the questions referred to cash crops but
did not include a full list of those crops. In other cases, there were discrepancies among
respondents about specic outlets (for example, whether a matooke truck could also work
as a coee truck intermediary) or about the periodicity of markets (daily as opposed to
occasional stalls or truck presence). While attenuation bias would cause OLS to be smaller
19than IV, the endogeneity bias (such that higher poverty correlates with lower market density)
would produce larger IV estimates instead. As in many other cases in the literature, our
results suggest that attenuation bias is strong and dominates the endogeneity bias. There
are numerous similar examples in the literature on the returns to schooling (Card, 1999),
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001), and trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999).
To further support the argument that attenuation bias is strong, we run, as in Acemoglu
et al. (2001), an IV regression using a measure of overall market availability (agricultural
goods, food, inputs, consumer goods) as a pseudo-instrument for export market density. This
pseudo-instrument would x the attenuation bias but would not x the endogeneity bias
(because overall market availability is endogenous itself). In these IV models, the estimates
are  0:89(0:36),  0:31(0:14), and  0:29(0:15) for Models 1-3, respectively. These
estimates are purged from the attenuation bias but are, nevertheless, close to our consistent
IV estimate, thus suggesting that measurement error causes an attenuation bias of the right
order of magnitude. While this strategy does not provide a formal test of attenuation bias
vis- a-vis endogeneity bias, it gives a sense of their relative magnitudes. As in Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001), attenuation bias can indeed be quite strong.
Since the poverty indicator P is a dichotomous variable, we set up Probit models of
poverty with endogenous regressors in addition to the linear models described above. We
work with a control function approach, which requires the inclusion of the residuals from the
rst stage regression, together with the endogenous variable, in the second stage regression
(Newey, 1987; Blundell and Powell, 2004). Results are reported in the third panel of Table
4. Our nding, that export market density is conducive to poverty reduction, is robust to
the Probit specication. The magnitudes of the marginal eects, equal to  0:35 in Model
3, are slightly higher, but comparable, to the linear case.
The last panel of Table 4 reports results where the dependent variable is the log of per
equivalent adult expenditure (the measure of household wellbeing that is used to compute
the poverty count). As expected, we nd a strong positive association between household
expenditures and the availability of export markets. In Models 2 and 3, an increase in export
market density of 5 percentage points would cause the per equivalent adult expenditure of a
20typical Ugandan household to increase by 3.65 percentage points. While our main interest is
in poverty impacts, this result shows that the availability of export markets can bring about
benets for all households in Uganda, not only for poorer ones.
4.2 The Exports Channel
We have established a causal relationship between marketing costs, as measured by market
density, and poverty. In this section we show that the adoption of export crops is
an important channel that explains this relationship: when marketing costs are lower,
households nd it protable to reallocate some resources from the production of home
consumption crops to higher-yield export crops. We rst show that export crops become
more prevalent when market density is higher; and later show that growing export crops
does indeed substantially help reduce poverty at the household level.
We begin by estimating the following regression model







where shc is the measure of export participation, dened as the share of land allocated to
export crops and, alternatively, as the share of income derived from export crops, Mc is
market density, prc is the export crop price index, xs
hc are household controls, and zc are
district controls.19
As in the poverty model (10), market density may be endogenous to participation in
export markets. That is, more markets may develop in those districts where farmers are more
likely to grow export crops. To account for this, we use the out-of-district transportation cost
to international markets, measured as the cost of transportation to Kampala, as instrument
19It is important to look at both dependent variables|share of land and share of income|since they
reveal dierent aspects of the decision to produce for exports. Land allocation is the most straightforward
indicator of participation because it measures the allocation of household capital to alternative uses. A
problem with measures of land allocation is that, depending on the crop, it may respond slowly to changes
in the independent variables. This is the case, for example, with tree crops like coee or tea. In these
instances, it may be dicult for farmers to switch from tree crops to food crops (or vice versa) after a change
in contemporaneous variables. However, farmers can adjust other inputs, like eort or fertilizer. If coee
prices are low, for instance, farmers may prefer to keep the trees but put less eort or apply less fertilizer.
A better measure to account for these eects is thus the share of income generated by the export crops.
21for Mc.20
We adopt the same three specications as in (10) and report results in Table 5. Column
(1) corresponds to the simple model with only household controls. In column (2), we add
the measures of district infrastructure and other observed characteristics, as well as the
export price index, to control for confounding community eects; in column (3) we add food
market density as a control. We nd very strong evidence that a higher export market
density induces farmers to participate more in export agriculture. This result holds for all
specications. It also holds for our alternative measure of export cropping, namely the share
of income derived from them|see Table 6. This is an important result: improved trade
facilitation and lower export marketing costs matter for export crop participation. The
point estimate is b 2 = 0:18; an increase in export market density of 5 percentage points
would cause the average land share devoted to export crops to increase by 0.9 percentage
points, equivalent to 13 percent of the average export participation (around 7 percent in
Table 1).
Since our two measures of export participation are shares that are left censored at 0 and
right censored at 1, we estimate Tobit models with a control function approach (to account
for the endogeneity of export market availability). As before, this requires that we include
the estimated residuals from the rst stage regression along with the endogenous variable and
the other exogenous regressors in a standard Tobit model. In the second panel of Table 5,
we show that our ndings are robust to censoring of the export participation variables. The
coecients on market density are positive and highly signicant. Furthermore, the marginal
eects of the Tobit estimates (the change in the unconditional average land share) is 0:18,
the same as the IV estimate in the rst panel.
Table 6 reproduces the structure of Table 5 but uses the alternative denition of export
crop participation, the share of income derived from cotton, tea, coee, pineapples and
passion fruit. Our ndings are robust to this denition.
We turn now to the last link in our hypothesis: whether, at the household level, the
adoption of export crops is associated with lower probability of poverty (and to a higher
20See Section 5 for results with an additional instrument.
22level of expenditure). The regression model is







where, as before, Phc is a dichotomous variable indicating poverty and shc is participation
in export activities (measured by share of land or share of income). Both variables are
dened at the household level. We are mostly interested in estimates of 3, the coecient of
export participation. Notice that participation in export cropping may be endogenous to the
poverty status if, for instance, richer households are able to nance any start-up investments
needed to enter export markets. Also, richer households may have more educated heads, who
may be more productive in export crops. Our previous results suggest possible instruments
for export cropping, namely the out-of-district cost of transportation to Kampala.21
Table 7 shows the results from instrumental variable regressions for the two denitions
of export participation, the share of land and the share of income. The rst three columns
correspond to models of land shares, and the last three, to models of income shares. In
the rst row, we report results from linear IV models. In the second row, we report Probit
models with endogenous regressors (using the control function method).
Overall, the relationship between these variables is negative: households involved in the
production of export crops (like cotton, tea, coee, fruits) are less likely to be poor than
households that are not involved in export markets. We nd that, indeed, lower marketing
costs encourage export participation and lead to lower poverty. For instance, doubling export
participation (from 7 percent land shares to 14 percent land shares) would reduce poverty
by 13 percentage points (using the point estimates of the Probit marginal eects in Model 3
of the land shares).
In the last panel of Table 7, we report IV estimates of the relationship between export
participation and per equivalent adult expenditures. As expected, this association is positive
and statistically signicant. The implication is that export participation not only reduces the
21It may be argued that this is not a good instrument because by using it as an instrument in equation
(11) it satises the exclusion restriction and is thus not correlated with the shares shc. This is not correct.
The instrument is, indeed, the predictions of M from the rst stage regression. In practice, in the linear
model, this is the same as using out-of-district transportation costs directly in the IV estimation.
23likelihood of poverty but also increases the average level of expenditure of Ugandan farmers.
4.3 Discussion
While the focus of our work is on how export market density (including the presence of
intermediaries, local markets and export crop plantations) fosters export agriculture and
reduces poverty, other channels may also play a role. One of those channels is the provision
of market information. Goyal (2008) shows that the implementation of e-Choupal, the
introduction of warehouses and internet kiosks providing price information in rural India,
caused soybean prices and land shares allocated to this crop to increase. Jensen (2007) shows
how the adoption of mobile phones by South Indian shermen reduced price dispersion,
improved eciency in the sheries sector, and increased consumer and producer welfare in
the region. In addition, other complementary factors may matter. For example, Ashraf,
Gin e and Karlan (2008) show that DrumNet, a project of PRIDE AFRICA to provide
poor farmers with technical information, credit, and intermediation services, was initially
successful in facilitating adoption of export crops and in increasing farm income. But the
project collapsed later on due to low quality to meet European standards.
As explained in the model of section 2, there are two main reasons why a high market
density can facilitate adoption and lower poverty: lower marketing costs within a district
and higher oered prices. While in our model market density is determined by out-of-district
transportation costs, district size or productivity parameters, more generally there might be
other forces at play as well, especially hold up and incomplete contracting. With incomplete
markets, hold up is very likely to arise, farmers end up receiving low price when there are few
intermediaries, and few intermediaries thus enter. As a result, the adoption of export crops
is hindered and poverty increases. This story is entirely consistent with our analysis. To
see this, Figure 5 uncovers the strong positive association between the export crop market
density and the export price index. It indeed suggests that higher market availability could
lead to lower poverty via a price mechanism arising from more competition (and also from a
lower likelihood of hold up) among intermediaries. However, this is not the channel that we
24emphasize in this paper which focuses instead on marketing costs in export crops.22 Since
our approach only identies the poverty impacts via lower marketing costs, our estimates
provide a lower bound for the overall impacts of markets.
Our ndings support the recent emphasis on the \aid for trade" approach to development
policy which advocates poverty alleviation via aid aimed at expanding export opportunities
and domestic complementarities to trade. To put our results into perspective we ask now
about the potential for \aid for trade" as a vehicle for poverty reduction. Policymakers often
need to choose among various interventions and it is useful to give a sense of the ecacy of
this \aid for trade" strategy. In principle, we could use our regression results to compare
the estimates of reductions in poverty due to increases in export market availability with the
impacts of other social or infrastructure programs. This exercise is, however, of limited value
for at least two reasons. First, social programs in health or education should be in place
within the context of a broader development agenda, beyond poverty considerations alone.
Second, as explained above, our estimation strategy is tailored to identify the impacts of
export market density only and cannot thus identify the causal eect of the other controls in
our regressions. Instead, we assess our estimates by comparing the impacts of export market
availability with other trade related barriers, such as market access barriers in developed
countries, tari protection, and subsidies.
We propose to perform an experiment to calculate the increase in the export prices of
agricultural products that would generate the same reduction in poverty as an increase
in export market density of 5 percentage points. Although a full cost-benet analysis of
competing policies for poverty reduction is beyond the scope of this discussion, with an
average market density of 0.37 and a standard deviation of 0.31 (see Table 3), an increase
of Mc of 0.05 seems plausible with a combination of increased incentives to FDI plantations,
reductions in transport costs, or improvements in export productivity. Using the IV and
IV-Probit estimates, poverty would decline by between 1.4 and 1.75 percentage points.
Notice that farm-gate prices are kept constant in this exercise so that the decline in poverty
22See Kranton and Swamy (2008) for a model of hold up with one exporter and one local producer of
textiles in India and Brambilla and Porto (2007) and Ashraf, Gin e and Karlan (2008) for examples on
Zambia and Kenya.
25due to the increase in market density takes places only via the reduction in marketing costs
(within districts).
To compute the \export price change equivalent," we adopt (for simplicity) a scenario
with only rst order eects (that is, without supply responses). A rst order change in the
income generating equation of a typical farmer is given by
(13) dlnyh = s
e
hdlnp;
where dlnyh is the change in income of household h resulting from the price change dlnp,
and se
h is the share of income derived from export crops. For a given price change, we use
this equation to calculate the changes in household per equivalent adult (assuming all the
additional income is consumed) and to recompute the poverty count until the poverty rate
declines by between 1.4 and 1.75 percentage points (keeping market density constant). This
iterative process reveals non-trivial price-equivalent changes, ranging from 11 to 17 percent.
Clearly, signicant liberalization of world export markets, or a sizeable growth in demand
of Ugandan agricultural exports would be needed to achieve these price changes. While this
is a simple exercise, it neatly shows how important the poverty-reducing impacts of lower
marking costs can be.
5 Robustness and Sensitivity
One of the main concerns with our estimation strategy is that we have relied only on one
instrument in the instrumental variables estimator. In order to perform specication tests,
we redo the whole analysis using two instruments. To do this, we add export market density
in 1995 to our main instrument (the out-of-district cost of transportation to Kampala).
This lag captures the fact that markets are sometimes focal points that tend to perpetuate.
Although it is fairly common to use lagged variables as instruments, there are some concerns
to address. First, it is important to ask if the same correlation between market availability
and poverty in t may be present between market availability in t   T and poverty in t
(where T is the number of year between household surveys, 1999 and 1995 in this case). For
26instance, if there is autocorrelation in the residuals in (10), then the endogeneity argument
that invalidates the results from OLS may also invalidate the results from the use of lagged
instruments. Similarly, lagged instruments will not work if there are persistent omitted
variables. Here, we claim that the autocorrelation in the errors becomes a second order
problem. We are actually merging data from the 1999 UNHS with an instrument taken from
the 1995 UNHS. Since four years separate these surveys, there is good reason to believe that
the correlation will be practically absent. Another problem is that, since our instrument
varies across districts, the instrument is required to be uncorrelated with all lags of the
residuals, a requirement that might fail in the presence of district xed eects. Since we
are accounting for district eects by including a comprehensive set of district controls zc, we
argue that this requirement is met.
Results are reported in Table 8. The instruments work well, both according to the
predictive power in the rst stage regression and to the Hansen specication test of
overidentifying restrictions. The magnitudes of the impacts are similar to those in previous
sections.
Another concern is that the impacts of lower export marketing costs might be dierent for
households already engaged in export crops than for households that choose not to produce
exportables. This situation may arise if, for example, there are factors (such as land quality)
that might prevent participation in export crops in certain locations, independently of the
marketing costs. While our regressions include controls for land quality (at the district level),
it is worth exploring this further by performing our analysis on the selected sample, i.e., on
the sample of export crop producers. A summary of the main results is in Table 9.
The overall causal link from export markets to poverty can still be found on the sample
of export crop producers. In Panels A) and B), we nd that lower marketing costs in export
agriculture causes household expenditure to increase and poverty to decline. Even though
the coecients are large, they are not strictly comparable to the previous estimates because
the samples are dierent. For example, poverty responds roughly twice as strongly for the
selected sample than for the whole sample ( 0:64 and  0:35, respectively, in the Probit
specication for poverty). However, since about a third of the sample produces export
27crops, the impacts on the aggregate poverty rate would actually be smaller if only the export
crop producers are allowed to be aected by higher export market availability. Further, the
mechanisms outlined above, from export market availability to adoption and from adoption
to poverty, are still observed as well. As expected, however, some of the links are weaker (in
a statistical sense) because there is less variation across export producers in land allocation.
We conclude that while the overall impacts and channels are present in the selected sample,
the impacts are somewhat smaller. This conrms typical ndings of this type of literature
whereby larger impacts (on poverty, supply responses, etc.) are estimated when the extensive
margin is considered on top of the intensive margin (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000).
6 Conclusions
The main claim of this paper is that the way in which trade aects poverty is shaped
by complementarities between export opportunities and domestic factors. In the presence
of export opportunities, such as enlarged market access in developed countries or high
international prices for major export crops like coee, tea, cotton and fruits, the potential
gains from exports may not be realizable if complementary domestic factors are unavailable.
We have explored this hypothesis by investigating the case of intermediation activities,
marketing costs, export crop adoption, and poverty in Uganda.
Our ndings make two contributions to the related literature. We generate direct evidence
that exports matter for poverty reduction: farmers that are able to adopt high-yield export
crops are on average less poor than farmers more oriented towards subsistence activities.
Further, we provide direct evidence of the importance of complementary policies to the
realization of the gains from trade: trade costs matter for poverty reduction because high
trade costs prevent farmers from adopting major export crops. This is mostly a transaction
costs argument whereby the presence of export markets facilitates the marketing of export
crops and allows farmers to fetch a higher net price for their output.
Policies that reduce trade costs and encourage marketing activities in rural areas may
be useful to facilitate exports and reduce poverty. Examples include roads, marketing
28information, and measures that promote the development of market arrangements such
as FDI (in, for instance, coee and tea plantations) or outgrower schemes (like the coee
alliance initiative in Uganda). These ndings support the recent emphasis on the \aid for
trade" approach to development policy. While policies targeting education, health, gender
participation and the like are important not only in terms of poverty reduction but also in
terms of overall socio-economic development, our results emphasize the potential scope for
poverty alleviation via increased export market density. In fact, our ndings suggest that the
poverty impacts of higher market availability could be sizeable: simple back of the envelope
calculations show that they could be equivalent to the poverty impacts of large increases
in export prices resulting from, for example, market access to developed countries or other
similar instruments as discussed in the Doha Development Agenda.
Appendix A: Two Theoretical Results
We want to show that both the probability of specializing in export crops and expected income
are increasing in the number of intermediaries in a district. That is, that (p;n) and Y (p;n)
from equations (8) and (9) are increasing in n when keeping p constant. Both equations can be
generically written as an integral of the form





















which is strictly positive for any function g strictly decreasing in x.
In the case of the probability of specializing in export crops, (p;n), g is equal to the probability
of specializing in export crops at a given distance x,





























which is also strictly decreasing in x. Thus, both (p;n) and Y (p;n) are strictly decreasing in x,
the result we wanted to show.
Appendix B: Household and District Controls
Table A1 shows the results of the IV linear model of poverty on market density.
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32Figure 1















Note: An intermediary and its right competitor compete for farmers located in
[0;1=n]. Some of these farmers choose to produce food crops. At given prices, the
fraction of farmers that sell export crops to intermediary i is given by the area to the
left of e x and above e A.
Figure 2
Equilibrium
Note: Simulation of the Prot Maximization and Zero Prot combinations of price
and number of intermediaries under an exponential distribution of returns to export
crops; f(A) = e A. The parameter values are: =0.2, R=4, =10, P=13, D=2,
d=1.
33Figure 3
Export Crop Activity in Uganda
a) Coee b) Tea
c) Cotton d) Passion fruit & Pineapple
Note: The maps show the geographical distribution of export crop production in Uganda. They were built based
on the crop module from the Uganda National Household Survey (1999) and FAO Country Proles and Mapping
Information System.
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Note: The graphs report non-parametric regressions. The estimates are obtained with a Fan locally weighted
linear regression. We use a Gaussian kernel and bandwidths of 0.15, 0.15, and 0.05.
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Note: The graph reports a non-parametric regression of the export price index on
export market density. The estimates are obtained with a Fan locally weighted linear
regression. We use a Gaussian kernel and bandwidths of 0.15.
36Table 1
Summary Statistics. Uganda National Household Survey
Average Std. Dev
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Household size 5.67 3.05
Male heads 0.74 0.44
Married heads 0.71 0.45
Males 0.49 0.22
Age 18-45 0.30 0.23
Age 46- 0.16 0.26
Age 0-5 0.19 0.18
Age 6-12 0.22 0.18
Age 12-18 0.13 0.16
POVERTY
Monthly per equivalent adult expenditure (PPP US$) 42.64 38.70
Urban poverty line (PPP US$)1 38.09
Rural poverty line (PPP US$)2 31.44
Poverty rate 35.2
EXPORT PARTICIPATION
Cultivated land (in acres) 2.57 3.52
Share of land in export crops 0.07 0.17
Share of income from export crops 0.08 0.17
HEALTH
Proportion of sick members 0.31 0.30
Proportion of sick children 0.25 0.34
Sick mother 0.22 0.42
Number of children 2.63 1.97
Sick mother * number of children 0.63 1.61
INCOME & ASSETS3
Remittances 0.48 0.50
Non-farm income 0.35 0.48
Animal assets 0.71 0.45
Equipment assets 0.99 0.08
Note: own calculations from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 1999/2000.
1. The urban poverty line is equivalent to 1.27 PPP US dollars per day.
2. The rural poverty line is equivalent to 1.05 PPP US dollars per day.
3. National averages are constructed from dichotomous variables at the household level that indicate whether
a household received remittances or not, etc.
37Table 2
Major Exports in Uganda (1999-2000)










Note: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Compiled by the
Uganda Export Promotion Board.
38Table 3
Summary Statistics: Uganda National Household Survey
Market Density and Village Controls
Average Std. Dev.
MARKET DENSITY
Export crops 0.37 0.31
Food 0.76 0.24
DISTRICT CONTROLS1
Distance to paved road 25.90 21.28
Access to credit 0.68 0.30
Access to improved seeds 0.58 0.28
Access to oxen 0.26 0.36
Access to oxen rental 0.21 0.31
Access to tractors 0.12 0.18
Access to extension services 0.38 0.24
Output market constraints 0.15 0.14
Input market constraints 0.16 0.12
Road constraints 0.05 0.08
Disease constraints 0.22 0.18
Security constraints 0.01 0.03
Land constraints 0.15 0.20
Credit constraints 0.04 0.08
Land fertility constraints 0.08 0.09
Access to veterinary services 0.28 0.26
Land conict 0.13 0.12
Land community 0.08 0.23
Access to primary school 0.49 0.21
Free medicine 0.43 0.32
Election 0.11 0.18
Access to water 0.53 0.21
Public hospital 0.27 0.20
Private hospital 0.32 0.23
Note: own calculations from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 1999/2000.
1. All district variables except distance to paved roads are constructed from dichotomous
variables at the community level.
39Table 4
Poverty and Market Density
Instrumental Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV - Linear Model
Export Market Density  0:56  0:27  0:28
(0:11) (0:13) (0:13)
Export Price Index {  0:01  0:01
(0:009) (0:009)
Food Market Density { {  0:011
(0:02)
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
R2 0.11 0.21 0.21
First stage coecient  0:038  0:027  0:028
Standard error (0:006) (0:008) (0:008)
R2 0.37 0.76 0.77
OLS
Export Market Density  0:27  0:12  0:11
(0:06) (0:04) (0:04)
R2 0.14 0.21 0.21
IV - Probit
Export Market Density  1:71  0:97  0:98
Marginal eect  0:62  0:35  0:35
Standard error (marg. eects) (0:12) (0:15) (0:15)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
IV - per equivalent adult expenditure
Export Market Density 1:14 0:73 0:73
(0:20) (0:23) (0:24)
R2 0.32 0.39 0.40
Observations 6734 6743 6743
Note: The dependent variable in the rst three panels is a dichotomous indicator of whether the household
is poor or not. In the last panel, the dependent variable is the log of per equivalent adult expenditure of the
household. The main independent variable is export market density, which measures market availability
for export agriculture produce.
The rst panel reports results from 2SLS of poverty on market density. We report the coecient, the
cluster-corrected standard errors, the R2, and results from the rst stage regression. The second panel
reports OLS estimates from the same model. The third panel reports estimates from a probit model with
endogenous regressor (using the control function approach). We report the coecient, the marginal eects
with their cluster-corrected standard errors, and the pseudo R2: Finally, the last panel includes IV results
for log per equivalent adult expenditure.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
40Table 5
Export Participation and Market Density
Share of Land
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV { Linear Model
Coecient 0.30 0.18 0.18
Standard error (0:052) (0:07) (0:07)
R2 0.13 0.21 0.21
IV { Tobit
Marginal eect 0:31 0:18 0:18
Standard error (0:040) (0:052) (0:050)
Observations 6554 6554 6554
Export Price Index No Yes Yes
Food Markets No No Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Export participation is measured with the share of land devoted to export crops
(coee, tea, cotton, pineapples, passion fruit).
The rst panel shows results from 2SLS regressions of export participation on export market
density. The second panel shows MLE results from a Tobit specication with endogenous
variables (using the control function approach). Standard errors (within parenthesis) are
cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
41Table 6
Export Participation and Market Density
Share of Income
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
IV { Linear Model
Coecient 0.29 0.14 0.14
Standard error (0:05) (0:06) (0:06)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
IV { Tobit
Marginal eect 0:35 0:29 0:29
Standard error (0:057) (0:049) (0:049)
Observations 6606 6606 6606
Export Price Index No Yes Yes
Food Markets No No Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes
District characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Export participation is measured with the share of income generated by export crops
(coee, tea, cotton, pineapples, passion fruit).
The rst panel shows results from 2SLS regressions of export participation on export market
density. The second panel shows MLE results from a Tobit specication with endogenous
variables (using the control function approach). Standard errors (within parenthesis) are
cluster-corrected.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Robustness to Set of Instruments
Two Instruments
Poverty Exports & Markets Poverty & Exports
& markets Share land Share income Share land Share income
(Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model 3) (Model3)
IV { Linear Model  0:26 0.15 0.13  1:45  1:80
(0:11) (0:06) (0:05) (0:89) (1:19)
0.21 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.21
IV { Probit/Tobit  0:32 0.13 0.24  1:86  2:15
(0:013) (0:024) (0:047) (0:90) (1:02)
0.18 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.15
Test of Instruments
F-test (rst stage) 11.49 11.19 9.61 8.43 6.84
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 (rst stage) 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.21 0.16
Test of Overidentication
2 0.178 0.773 0.765 0.290 0.029
P-value 0.673 0.379 0.382 0.591 0.865
Observations 6734 6554 6606 6554 6606
Note: Instrumental variable estimates using two instruments, the out-of-district cost of transportation to Kampala and
the lagged export market density in 1995. Poverty is dened as a dichotomous variable of whether the household is poor
or not. Export participation is measured with the share of land devoted to export crops (coee, tea, cotton, pineapples,
passion fruit) and with the share of income generated by sales of these crops. The linear model is estimated with IV and the
IV-Probit model is estimated with control function methods. Standard errors (within parenthesis) are cluster-corrected.
Based on the Uganda National Household Survey 1995/96 and 1999/2000.
44Table 9
Export Crops, Marketing Costs, and Poverty
Impacts of Export Crop Producers
Instrumental Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
A) Poverty and Markets
IV  0:95  0:61  0:60
(0:19) (0:31) (0:30)
R2 0.21 0.26 0.26
IV-Probit (marg. eect)  1:08  0:65  0:64
(0:17) (0:33) (0:32)
R2 0.18 0.23 0.23
B) Expenditures and Markets
IV 1:80 1:44 1:44
(0:32) (0:52) (0:52)
R2 0.41 0.46 0.46
C) Export Participation and Markets
IV 0:53 0:24 0:24
(0:11) (0:14) (0:14)
R2 0.15 0.21 0.21
D) Poverty and Export Participation
IV-Probit (marg. eect)  2:05  2:65  2:64
(0:32) (1:49) (1:50)
R2 0.18 0.23 0.23
E) Expenditures and Export Participation
IV 3:39 6:62 6:17
(0:51) (3:27) (3:28)
R2 0.41 0.46 0.46
Observations 2545 2545 2545
Note: The table presents results using only the sample of export crop producers. Based on the
Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000.
45Table A1
Poverty and Market Density
Household and District Controls
Instrumental Variables Linear Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Household size 0:0198 0:0201 0:0201
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Male head 0:0092 0:0348 0:0351
(0:0272) (0:0221) (0:0221)
Male married  0:0003 0:0081 0:0081
(0:0093) (0:0086) (0:0086)
Number of males 0:0952 0:0937 0:0934
(0:029) (0:0271) (0:0269)
Age 12-18 0:2959 0:2884 0:2882
(0:0558) (0:0508) (0:0508)
Age 46+ 0:0386 0:0399 0:0401
(0:0326) (0:0283) (0:0281)
Age 0-5 0:2520 0:2327 0:2327
(0:0498) (0:0490) (0:0491)
Age 6-12 0:4344 0:4142 0:4139
(0:0539) (0:0544) (0:0543)
Literacy of head  0:0873  0:0639  0:0637
(0:0285) (0:0258) (0:0258)
Education (no schooling)  0:0043  0:0040  0:0037
(0:0737) (0:0769) (0:0765)
Education (primary incomplete)  0:0163  0:0155  0:0155
(0:0743) (0:0758) (0:0756)
Education (primary complete)  0:1093  0:1011  0:1008
(0:0785) (0:0781) (0:0777)
Education (junior incomplete)  0:1870  0:1822  0:1819
(0:0792) (0:0791) (0:0788)
Education (junior complete)  0:1561  0:1494  0:1498
(0:0832) (0:0920) (0:0919)
Education (senior incomplete)  0:1690  0:1605  0:1602
(0:0710) (0:0704) (0:0700)
Education (senior complete)  0:3265  0:2996  0:2991
(0:0794) (0:0782) (0:0776)
Education (superior) 0:3329  0:2515  0:2509
(0:1093) (0:095) (0:095)
Health status (head)  0:0239  0:0394  0:0396
(0:0177) (0:0127) (0:0129)
Note: Estimates of household and district controls from the model of poverty on export
market density. Instrumental variables. Standard errors within parenthesis (: signicant
at 10% level; : signicant at 5% level;   : signicant at 1% level).
46Table A1 (continued)
Poverty and Market Density: Household and District Controls
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Access to credit   0:0238 0:0242
  (0:0784) (0:0785)
Access to improved seeds    0:0514  0:0498
  (0:0582) (0:0581)
Access to oxen   0:5457 0:5474
  (0:1423) (0:1420)
Access to oxen rental    0:3474  0:3496
  (0:1240) (0:1236)
Access to tractors    0:0303  0:0293
  (0:0775) (0:0779)
Input market constraints    0:1478  0:1464
  (0:1087) (0:1087)
Road constraints    0:3497  0:3430
  (0:1626) (0:1612)
Disease constraints    0:1714  0:1720
  (0:0882) (0:0888)
Security constraints    0:0931  0:1027
  (0:3473) (0:3472)
Land constraints    0:2025  0:2041
  (0:0876) (0:0883)
Credit constraints   0:0795 0:0822
  (0:2751) (0:2732)
Land fertility constraints    0:3894  0:3880
  (0:1364) (0:1376)
Access to veterinary services   0:1477 0:1469
  (0:0677) (0:0678)
Land conict   0:2058 0:2071
  (0:0840) (0:0843)
Land community    0:1178  0:1215
  (0:0602) (0:0613)
Access to primary school    0:0152  0:0141
  (0:0519) (0:0521)
Free medicine    0:1112  0:1100
  (0:0460) (0:0455)
Election    0:1455  0:1419
  (0:0856) (0:0847)
Access to water   0:0885 0:0886
  (0:0737) (0:0734)
Public hospital    0:1023  0:1048
  (0:1229) (0:1221)
Private hospital    0:1142  0:1150
  (0:0722) (0:0725)
Observations 6734 6734 6734
R-squared 0:11 0:21 0:21
Note: Estimates of household and district controls from the model of poverty on
export market density. Instrumental variables. Standard errors within parenthesis
(: signicant at 10% level; : signicant at 5% level; : signicant at 1% level).
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